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A FRAMEWORK FOR THE EXAMINATION OF STATES
OF EMERGENCY UNDER THE AMERICAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Claudio Grossman*
INTRODUCTION
The role that the law can play in the regulation of states of emer-
gency is of enormous consequence to the Western hemisphere. The im-
portance of these emergency situations, also referred to as states of ex-
ception or states of siege,1 lies in both the frequency with which
American states resort to them and in the dangers that they pose to the
exercise of human rights. Because serious human rights violations ordi-
narily accompany emergency situations, the declaration of a state of
siege has come to be a warning signal for those who seek to protect
those human rights. Such protection often depends heavily on interna-
tional law.
A number of international treaties establish guidelines regulating
emergency situations.2 A regional treaty, the American Convention on
Human Rights, provides a legal framework for states of siege within
the Western hemisphere.3 This treaty regulates the assertion of emer-
gency powers by any state party to it. Since the adoption of the conven-
tion, however, there has been no comprehensive analysis of its provision
on states of emergency. After a general consideration of the signifi-
cance and effects of emergency situations and an analysis of the role
that international law can play in their regulation, this article will ex-
amine emergency situations under the American Convention's actual
language, its drafting history, and the extensive body of jurisprudence
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Ciencias Juridicas y Sociales, University of Chile; Doctor in de Rechtsgeleerdheid,
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1. These three terms are used interchangeably throughout this article.
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316
(1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, done Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
3. American Convention on Human Rights, done Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.TS. No.
36 at 1, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.23, doc.2, rev.6, OASOR OEA/Ser.K/XVI/I.l, doc.65,
rev.1, corr.2 (Jan. 7, 1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Convention].
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developed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, a ma-
jor supervisory organ for all state members of the O.A.S.4 Systematic
criteria will be proposed to assess the validity of states of siege under
the American Convention. This article will outline tests which states
must satisfy, first in declaring states of emergency, and second in plac-
ing restrictions on human rights during such emergencies. Finally, it
will offer suggestions for further enhancing the supervisory role of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in states of emergency.
I. SIGNIFICANCE AND EFFECTS OF STATES OF
EMERGENCY
A state of siege is governmental action taken during an extraordi-
nary national crisis that usually entails broad restrictions on human
rights in order to resolve the crisis. In theory the restrictions are limited
in time; once the crisis has been resolved the country would return to
full respect for universally recognized human rights. In a conflict be-
tween survival of the nation and strict enforcement of human rights,
international law doctrine supports national survival. In practice, how-
ever, restrictions on human rights have been more extreme and longer
lasting than necessary for national survival. In recent decades, the
American States have endured numerous states of emergency. The his-
torical record is a bleak one with regard to human rights violations:
states of emergency frequently are accompanied by disappearances,
summary executions, detentions without due process, torture, and other
forms of cruel and degrading treatment. Moreover, states of siege gen-
erally have profound negative effects on national political systems. Dur-
ing states of emergency, governments often eliminate educational and
artistic pluralism, restrict the ability to distribute and receive informa-
tion, and limit the freedom of political organization and unioniza-
tion-actions which impede the peaceful accommodation and integra-
tion of diverse social groups in the national polity. The search for
political solutions through negotiation and consensus gives way to reli-
ance on the military for settling disputes with opposition groups. The
increased concentration of governmental power, along with the destruc-
tion of societal checks and balances, creates and perpetuates en-
trenched authoritarian systems.5
4. Convention, supra note 3, at art. 41.
5. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, STATES OF EMERGENCY: THEIR IMPACT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 417-24 (1983) [hereinafter cited as INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS].
The present article does not refer to the declaration of states of emergency by reason
of natural disasters. See N. Questraiux, Study of the Implications for Human Rights of
Recent Developments Concerning Situations Known as States of Siege or Emergency,
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States of emergency have primarily been a means through which rul-
ing minorities safeguard their own threatened power by instituting a
permanent system of restrictions on human rights.' During emergen-
cies, persons in the government who are attracted by the exercise of
total and permanent power often emerge; the population becomes
frightened and resentful. The very same emergency powers which were
originally invoked for the salvation of the nation and the continuation
of its existence as an organized community paradoxically become the
vehicle for repressing the nation. In the end, the nation has to be saved
from its own saviours.
In the Western hemisphere, the preceding scenario has been followed
in all but a very few instances. It has been the rare exception when
those who proclaimed the state of emergency peacefully returned to full
respect for human rights. In practice, an emergency situation is not
easily ended; states of emergency are readily transformed from tempo-
rary situations into permanent ones. Indeed, the majority of cases of
states of emergency in the hemisphere indicate that the probability of
complete restoration of human rights by those who declared the origi-
nal states of emergency is inversely proportional to the magnitude of
human rights violations perpetrated during the emergencies.
U.N. Doec. E/CN.4Sub.2/1982/15 (July 27, 1982) at 8-10 (discussing the different
causes or reasons for declaring states of exception).
6. Id. at 415-16.
7. An analysis of the countries that have been the object of reports by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights confirms this hypothesis. From the entry into
force of the American Convention on Human Rights on July 18, 1978, the Inter-Amer-
ican Commission has issued reports on the following State Parties to the Convention:
Bolivia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.53 doc.6 (July 1, 1981) (Original in Spanish); Colombia,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.53, doec.22 (June 30, 1981) (Original in Spanish); Guatemala (2 re-
ports), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.53, doec.22, rev.2 (Oct. 13, 1981) (Original in Spanish),
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.61, doc.47, rev.l (Oct. 5, 1983) (Original in Spanish); Haiti, OEA/
Ser.L/V/1I.46, doc.66, rev.1 (Dec. 13, 1979) (Original in French); Nicaragua (2 re-
ports), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.53, doec.25 (June 30, 1981) (Original in Spanish), OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.62, doc.10, rev.3 (Nov. 29, 1983) (Original in Spanish).
In addition, the Commission issued reports on Nicaragua, OEA/Ser.L/V/Il.45,
doec.16, rev.1 (Nov. 17, 1978) (Original in Spanish), and Panama, OEA/Ser.L/V/
11.44, doec.38, rev.1 (June 22, 1978) (Original in Spanish), shortly before the Conven-
tion entered into force for those countries. The report on El Salvador, although it was
published just after the Convention entered into force, did not make specific reference
to it. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.46, doec.23, rev.1 (Nov. 17, 1978) (Original in Spanish).
Since 1962, the Commission has also issued the following reports on countries not
party to the American Convention: Cuba (8 reports), OEA/Ser.L/V/Il.4, doec.30
(May 1, 1962) (Original in Spanish), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.7, doec.4 (May 17, 1963)
(Original in Spanish), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.17, doec.4, rev.1 (Apr. 27, 1967) (Original in
Spanish), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doec.6, rev.1 (Nov. 17, 1970) (Original in Spanish),
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.35, dec.10 (Apr. 18, 1975) (Original in Spanish), OEA/Ser.L/V/
11.37, doc.4 (Feb. 25, 1976) (Original in Spanish), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.48, dec.7 (Dec.
14, 1979) (Original in Spanish), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.61, doec.29, rcv.l (Oct. 4, 1983);
1986]
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The grave effects of states of emergency and their natural tendency
to create chronic problems in the hemisphere present great challenges.
What role can law, particularly international law, play in addressing
these challenges? At the outset, it must be acknowledged that because
the problem is not solely juridical, neither is its solution. Moreover,
international law lacks powerful mechanisms for enforcement of its
own doctrine. Nevertheless, real possibilities do exist for international
law to play a role. First, at a minimum, international law can deny
legitimacy to those government acts that violate human rights, since
international law permits review of state action above the municipal
level. Without the existence of international norms, the legality of a
given action would only be contingent upon the standards applicable in
the domestic realm. By establishing a superior level of review, interna-
tional law both strengthens those who seek its compliance and weakens
those who embark upon its violations, thereby affecting their
legitimacy.
Second, international law is not only an expression of an ideal duty,
but is also, in great measure, a reflection of what the populations of the
hemisphere consider just." Hence, it has become increasingly difficult to
exercise power, especially in the case of states of emergency, when such
exercise of power is combined with gross and systematic violations of
human rights. Such violations are more a confession of weakness than a
show of strength. Respect for human rights norms is therefore increas-
ingly more than a moral imperative; it is also a condition for the stable
Dominican Republic (5 reports), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.4, doc.32 (May 22, 1962) (Original
in Spanish), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.9, doc.6 (Apr. 1, 1964) (Original in Spanish), OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.12, doc.2, rev. (June 23, 1965) (Original in Spanish), OEA/Ser.L/V1
11.13, doc.14, rev. (Oct. 15, 1965) (Original in Spanish), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.15, doc.6,
rev.28 (Oct. 28, 1966) (Original in Spanish); Haiti, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.8, doc.5 (Oct.
21, 1963) (Original in Spanish); Argentina, OEA/Ser.L/V/1I.49, doc.19 (Apr. 11,
1980) (Original in Spanish); Chile (3 reports), OEA/Ser.L/V/11.34, doc.21, corr.1
(Oct. 25, 1974) (Original in Spanish), OEA/Ser.L/V/Il.37, doc.19, corr.l (June 28,
1976) (Original in Spanish), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.40, doc.10 (Feb. 11, 1977) (Original in
Spanish); Uruguay, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.43, doc.19, corr.1 (Jan. 31, 1978) (Original in
Spanish); Paraguay, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.43, doc.13, corr.l (Jan. 31, 1978) (Original in
Spanish); El Salvador and Honduras, OEA/Ser.L/V/1I.23, doc.9, rev. (Sept. 17,
1970) (Original in Spanish); Suriname (2 reports), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.61, doc.6, rev.l
(Oct. 5, 1983) (Original in English), OEA/Ser.L./V/II.66, doc.21, rev.i (Oct. 2,
1985) (Original in English).
8. See, e.g., Preface to the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man:
"The American peoples have acknowledged the dignity of the individual, and their na-
tional constitutions recognize that judicial and political institutions ... have as their
principle aim the protection of the essential rights of man ...... American Declara-
tion of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth Int'l
Conf. of Am. States (Mar. 30-May 2, 1948) in Bogota, OASOR OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4,
rev. (1965).
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exercise of power.
II. CRITERIA NECESSARY TO DECLARE STATES OF
EMERGENCY
Article 27 of the American Convention op Human Rights regulates
the suspension of human rights guarantees during states of emergency.
Paragraph 1 of that article provides:
In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the indepen-
dence or security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating from its
obligations under the present Convention to the extent and for the period of time
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures
are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law and do not
involve discrimination on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or
social origin.9
9. Convention, supra note 3, at art. 27, para. 1. This provision was the product of
an extensive process of investigation, discussion, and juridical formulation performed
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. In effect, the Commission began
consideration of the subject of states of emergency early, beginning with the inclusion
of Part 4 in its General Work Program adopted October 9, 1962, proposing:
[t]o examine the history and the current use of the institution of the State of
Siege (estado de sitio, estado de emergencia, suspension de garantias, etc.) in
order to ascertain whether and in what manner its practice derogates from the
respect for human rights, and to determine whether the institution of the State of
Siege can or should be subject to codification and definition of principles which
could be observed throughout the Hemisphere, considering, furthermore, whether
and in what manner the imposition of and practices under the State of Siege
could be considered in the international field.
Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on the Work Accomplished During
Its Fifth Session, September 24 to October 26, 1962, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.5, doc.40 (Feb.
18, 1963) at 19-21 [hereinafter cited as Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights].
In April 1964, the Secretariat of the Commission adopted its first study, Preliminary
Study of the State of Siege and the Protection of Human Rights in the Americas,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.8, doc.6 (Apr. 1964). In that study, the Commission named one of
its members, Dr. Daniel Hugo Martins, as rapporteur on the topic of the state of siege.
Dr. Martins compiled two reports. The first report took into account the preliminary
study of the Secretariat. The Protection of Human Rights in Connection with the Sus-
pension of Constitutional Guarantees, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.9, doec.14 (Apr. 13, 1964)
[hereinafter cited as 1964 Martins Report]. The second report, published in August
1967, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.15, doc.12 (Aug. 15, 1967), considered the observations and
commentaries of the Secretariat to the first report and the opinions of the Commission,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.10, doc.7 (Oct. 1, 1964). in addition to the preliminary study.
In light of the second report, the Commission approved a Resolution on the Protec-
tion of Human Rights in Connection with the Suspension of Constitutional Guarantees
or State of Siege, in May 1968. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.19, doc.32 (May 16, 1968). The
resolution, after more than four years of work, set forth its opinions on the state of
emergency. These opinions are of fundamental importance since, in conjunction with
the OAS Council resolution of June 12, 1968, OEA/Ser.G/IV/C-i-837, rev.3, they
requested that the Commission write a revised and complete text of a draft of the
Convention. That draft, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.19, doec.53, at 5-56 (Mar. 21, 1969), was
later adopted by the Council on October 2, 1968, OEA/Ser.G/IV/C-i-858, rev.3, as
working papers for the specialized conference in which the American Convention was
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A careful examination of article 27 suggests the existence of five con-
current but distinct elements, each required in order to validate the
declaration and maintenance of a state of emergency. These are: (1)
subject; (2) object; (3) cause; (4) proper notice; and (5) conduct. As a
preliminary matter, any analysis of these diverse requirements must
take into account that the' fundamental purpose of the American Con-
vention is the protection of human rights. From this it follows that any
norms by which the Convention permits restrictions on and suspensions
of these rights must be narrowly interpreted.10
A. SUBJECT
The "subject" of a declaration of exception is that legal person or
entity possessing the juridical capacity to declare the state of emer-
gency. Article 27 of the American Convention refers simply to the
"State Party" in this regard. The Convention does not explicitly indi-
cate which organ of the state party has the competence to issue such a
declaration. From the point of view of general international law, one
can argue that those who have the capacity to generate international
responsibility on behalf of the state party also have the capacity to re-
present the state in resorting to human rights derogations.
The assumption of international obligations by a state can originate
in the executive, legislative or judicial branches. Clearly, supervision of
the application of emergency measures is an appropriate function for
the judiciary. Indeed, article 27 specifically gives the courts a signifi-
cant role in ensuring that several basic rights are not violated even dur-
ing a state of emergency. 1 On the other hand, in the Western hemi-
sphere the principle of separation of powers generally renders the
judiciary incapable of declaring an emergency or passing on the valid-
adopted. OEA/Ser.K/XVI/I.1, doc.13 (Sept. 1969) at 1-22. Article 24 of the draft,
which previously referred to the state of emergency and reflected the opinions of the
Commission, later became article 27 of the American Convention. Article 24 was mod-
ified only insofar as article 27(1) added the term public danger to the list of occasions
warranting emergency action; article 27(2) mentioned articles as establishing nondero-
gable rights, expanding the list of such rights to include those provided for in articles 6.
9, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 23; lastly, article 27(2) modified the original reference to protec-
tion against arbitrary detention by affirming the non-derogability of judicial
guarantees.
10. See Convention, supra note 3, at art. 29 (establishing restrictive rules of con-
struction for the Convention); see also Van Hoof, The Protection of Human Rights
and the Impact of Emergency Situations under International Law with Special Refer-
ence to the Present Situation in Chile, 10 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 220-26, 233-35 (1977)
(noting emergency situations in which restrictions on human rights are permitted must
be interpreted narrowly because individual rights have primacy in international law).
11. Convention, supra note 3, at art. 27, para. 2.
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ity of such a declaration. In the alternative, to grant the executive
branch exclusive jurisdiction in this area presents the grave danger of
accumulation of power and the possibility of massive violations of
humarn rights. The tendency in international human rights law is,
therefore, to assign substantial power to the legislature in the declara-
tion of states of emergency.
In its 1968 Resolution on the Protection of Human Rights in Con-
nection with the Suspension of Constitutional Guarantees or State of
Siege, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights indicated
that a declaration of a state of emergency may not presuppose any re-
striction of the rule of law or provisions of the constitution, or any al-
teration of the scope of the branches of government.1 2 In the same
spirit, in article 29, with reference to rules of construction, the Conven-
tion forbids the interpretation of any provision in such a way as to ex-
clude rights or guarantees that are "derived from representative de-
mocracy as a form of government."' 3 In a representative democracy, an
important role is usually conferred upon the legislature, either to pro-
vide authorization prior to the declaration of an emergency situation or
to ratify post facto a declaration made by the executive when it was not
possible for the legislature to convene in order to consider the
declaration.
B. OBJECT
The "object" of the declaration of emergency is that which will be
affected by the declaration itself, namely the state's obligation to fully
protect and promote each of the rights guaranteed by the Convention.
For the object to be valid, a state declaring an emergency should com-
ply with all of the necessary requirements, namely competent subject,
valid cause, proper notice, and conduct.14
C. CAUSE
The "cause" of a declaration of a state of emergency is the particu-
lar fact pattern that compels the "subject" to derogate temporarily
from certain of its peace-time human rights obligations. Article 27 of
12. Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights, Resolution on the Protection of
Human Rights in Connection with the Suspension of Constitutional Guarantees or
State of Siege, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.19, doec.32 (May 16, 1968). For English version, see
Report on the Work Accomplished during its Eighteenth Session, OEA/Ser.L/V/
11.19, doec.30 (Sept. 12, 1968) at 45.
13. Convention, supra note 3, at art. 29(c).
14. See infra notes 58-70 and accompanying text (discussing the necessary require-
ments for declaring a state of emergency).
1986]
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the American Convention refers to the existence of "war, public danger
or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a
State Party" as legitimate grounds for such extreme action.'5 From the
very nature of these examples, it becomes apparent that a purported
crisis situation must satisfy at least three requirements in order to con-
stitute a legitimate cause.
i) The first requirement is that the cause be a real or imminent
event. Mere potential dangers, latent or speculative in nature, do not
warrant the proclamation of emergency conditions. In one of its earliest
examinations of this question, the Secretariat of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights expressed its concern regarding the dec-
laration of "fictitious states of siege," which it described as those in-
stances in which the events alleged to justify the emergency declaration
had not actually occurred.'
The Commission has been obliged to address violations of the re-
quirement of a real or imminent event committed by a number of
American states. Examining the situations in Argentina, Bolivia, Co-
lumbia, Chile, Grenada, El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay and
Uruguay in its 1980-81 annual report, the Commission critically ob-
served that in many instances the state party had declared an emer-
gency without complying with the above mentioned requirement, sim-
ply resorting to emergency powers as a device to garner broad powers
which the government otherwise lacked. "These exceptional measures,"
the Commission emphasized, "may only be justified in the face of real
threats to the public order or the security of the state."17
ii) To constitute valid cause, the situation must also be one of excep-
tional gravity. The Convention notes that the emergency must threaten
the independence or the security of the state party.'8 Even the actual
existence of war may not necessarily constitute such a threat. For ex-
15. Convention, supra note 3, art. 27, para. 1.
16. Preliminary Study of the State of Siege and the Protection of Human Rights in
the Americas, supra note 9, at 20-21.
17. Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1980-81,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, doc.9, rev.1 (Oct. 16, 1981) (Original in Spanish) at 115. See
also O'Donnell, Legitimidad de los Estados de Excepcion a ]a Luz de los Instrumentos
de Derechos Humanos (presented to the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights at
the Second Regional Reunion, Aug. 22-26, 1983; copy on file at the AM. U.J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y editorial offices) at 1 (discussing external military threats and internal secur-
ity disturbances as types of actual emergencies).
18. Convention, supra note 3, at art. 29(a). The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, supra note 2, and the European Convention, supra note 2, each
use the term "threat to the life of the nation." See generally O'Donnell, "States of
Exception", 21 THE REvIEw 54-55 (1978) (discussing the different circumstances
under which nations have invoked the "threat to the life of the nation" requirement of
the public emergency exception).
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ample, a war may take place at a great distance from the territory of a
country and not necessarily affect the normal life of a nation. Similarly,
simple declarations of war may not always be accompanied by belliger-
ent acts. As with all other public dangers, if a national government can
confront a war with its ordinary powers, it cannot use the war to de-
clare a state of emergency and thereby expand those powers.
Additionally, it is important to note that with one exception,'0 all
American States took part in the unanimous approval of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the General Assembly
of the United Nations on December 16, 1966. The Covenant requires
no less than a threat to the life of the nation as a prerequisite to a
declaration of a state of exception.20 Prior to the completion of the
American Convention on Human Rights, the Council of the Organiza-
tion of American States called for co-existence, compatibility and coor-
dination of that document with the International Covenant. 2' In light
of these facts, it is clear that the criteria necessary for declaring situa-
tions of emergency in the case of the American Convention are no less
strict than those in the universal instrument.22
Moreover, in its Preliminary Study of the State of Siege and the
19. The Peruvian delegate was absent at the time of the General Assembly vote on
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
20. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, at art. 4. As
noted previously, terminology similar to that of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights is used in article 15 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Under the latter Convention,
the meaning of the term "threat to the life of the nation" is defined, first in the Lawless
Case, 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTs 438 (Eur. Comm'n on Human
Rights) (merits), and later in the Greek Case, 1959 Y.B. EuR. CoNv. ON HUMAN
RImTs 72 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
21. Comparative Study of the United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political
Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and of the Draft Inter-American
Conventions on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.19, doc.18 (June 24, 1968) (Original
in Spanish).
22. See Comparative Study of the International Covenants on Human Rights, the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Adopted
by the United Nations (December 1966), the Draft Convention on Human Rights of
the Inter-American Council of Jurists (IACJ) (4th meeting, 1959), and the text of the
amendments to the IACJ Draft adopted by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (October 1966 and January 1967), OEA/Ser.L/V/I.19, doc.4, rev.l (Apr. 18,
1968) (Original in Spanish) at 5-7 (noting that International Covenant and IACJ draft
were "all but identical"). The Secretariat indicated, however, that there were some
differences between the Covenant and IACJ draft. First, the Covenant required that
any suspension of human rights be strictly limited to emergency situations and also
remain consistent with international law obligations. The IACJ draft mentioned only
the emergency situation requirement. Second, only the Covenant demanded that emer-
gencies be of a nature that "puts the life of the nation in danger." Finally, only the
Covenant allowed for the suspension of life, integrity of the person, liberty, and due
process of law. Id. at 7-8.
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Protection of Human Rights in the Americas, the Secretariat of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights made it clear that innu-
merable abuses had been committed under states of siege behind a
facade of guarding the security of the state.23 The Secretariat asserted
that facades will not do; only unusually serious cases warrant the proc-
lamation of a state of exception under the American Convention. In
this respect, it is noteworthy that Chile, Uruguay, and the Inter-Ameri-
can Council of Jurists had each submitted drafts of the American Con-
vention that would have made the standard for judging the gravity of a
situation dependent on the internal law of the country involved. The
acceptance of these proposals obviously would have diminished the sig-
nificance of the "cause" requirement. The San Jose Conference re-
jected the proposals and reaffirmed the position of the Commission,
which emphasized the extraordinary and grave character of situations
of emergency, and which assessed the level of gravity by more objective
international standards.
The requirement of extreme gravity imposes upon the state of siege a
strictly subsidiary character. Within the framework of the American
Convention, state parties may legitimately restrict the exercise of cer-
tain rights without resorting to the more drastic and sweeping action
involved in declaring a state of siege. Those articles of the Convention
dealing with the freedoms of thought and expression, 24 assembly,28 as-
sociation, 26 and movement and residence27 each permit governments to
restrict the exercise of these rights if expressly authorized by law and
"if necessary in a democratic society . . . to protect national security,
public safety, public order, public morals, public health, or the rights or
freedoms of others."' 28 The above mentioned provisions are designed to
enable the state to resolve most problems of public order. It is only
when the means to which the state can resort to maintain peace and
security-including legal restriction of certain selected rights-have
23. Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights, supra note 9, at 4. The pretext of
raising the security of the state in order to justify restrictions on human rights began to
be a major problem during the 1960's with the growth of the doctrine of national se-
curity that would inspire several Latin American dictators to commit massive and sys-
tematic violations of human rights under its guise. See Senese, The State of National
Security in Uruguay, International Law and the Rights of Peoples to Self-Determina-
tion, in COLLOQUIUM ON THE POLICY OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE STATE OF
EXCEPTION AND ITS REJECTION BY THE URUGUAYAN PEOPLE 32-36 (1981); INT'L
COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 5, at 416-17.
24. Convention, supra note 3, art. 2.
25. Id. at art. 15.
26. Id. at art. 16, para. 2.
27. Id. at art. 22, para. 3.
28. Id.
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failed that the state may resort to emergency powers. The Commission
has concurred with this general proposition. In its commentaries on a
major report prepared at its request by Dr. Daniel Hugo Martins, it
noted that a state of emergency can be declared only when ordinary
legislation is not sufficient.29
In its practice, the Commission has repeatedly emphasized that a
situation must be extraordinarily serious to constitute legitimate cause
for a state party to proclaim an emergency. In its 1981 report on Co-
lombia, for instance, the Commission indicated that constitutional pro-
visions on the state of siege were applicable only in exceptionally grave
cases.30 Later that year, the Commission listed certain requirements for
the use of emergency measures by state parties and concluded that the
new government of Bolivia had violated the "gravity of the situation"
requirement."' Finally, in its 1983 report on Nicaragua, the Commis-
sion firmly reiterated that the mere existence of armed conflict or other
national difficulty does not necessarily constitute valid cause for a dec-
laration of a state of emergency:
With respect to the first requisite of paragraph 1 of article 27, i.e., that there be
a state of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the indepen-
dence or security of the state, the doctrine generally accepts the propriety of
suspension of obligations in terms of human rights only when there are extremely
serious circumstances.U
iii) For the cause of an emergency declaration to be sufficient, the
Convention requires that the emergency affect the continued viability
of the organized community as a whole. It is important to note that
article 27, paragraph 1, of the American Convention refers only to the
state party and not to the government of that state party. The Inter-
American Commission, referring to this provision, has given notice that
"in interpreting the first part of paragraph 1 of article 27 of the Ameri-
can Convention,. . . the emergency should be of a serious nature, cre-
ated by an exceptional situation that truly represents a threat to the
organized life of the state."33 Commission Rapporteur Dr. Martins in-
dicated in an early report on the subject that valid cause for the decla-
ration of a state of siege includes only "serious cases that threaten the
integrity or existence of the three constitutional elements of the
state-people, territory, and legal order."'
29. Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights, supra note 9 at 19-21.
30. Report on Colombia, supra note 7, at 221.
31. Report on Bolivia, supra note 7, at 23.
32. 1983 Report on Nicaragua, supra note 7, at 121-22.
33. Id.
34. 1964 Martins Report, supra note 9. See generally Norris & Reiton, The Sus-
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Accordingly, two points of qualification are in order. First, a threat
to the government of the state party does not suffice as peaceful cir-
cumstances such as elections can threaten the continued existence of a
government. Moreover, the government of a state can itself be a threat
to the organized life of the country, and in such situations it cannot
legitimately rely on emergency powers to maintain itself in power. In
its 1978 report on Nicaragua, for example, the Inter-American Com-
mission concluded that the Somoza government, by violating essential
rights in a serious and consistent manner, had adversely affected all
segments of the Nicaraguan population. 5
The second point concerns the legal order of the state party. If at one
determined moment of its history, a state party has a legal order, the
application of which produces massive and systematic violations of in-
ternationally recognized human rights, the authorities of that state can-
not validly declare a state of siege and exercise emergency powers in
order to protect the existing legal system. The Convention justifies this
assertion. Article 1 of the Convention establishes an obligation of the
state to respect the human rights recognized in the Convention and to
ensure free and full exercise of these rights by all persons subject to its
jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind. 8 Article 2 of the Con-
vention establishes the duty of a state party to adopt domestic law pro-
visions permitting the exercise of these rights and freedoms if they were
not already ensured by legislative or other provisions.3" Other articles
of the Convention indicate an entire group of rights that state parties
must respect under any circumstances.3 8 In addition, article 29, regard-
ing rules of interpretation, bars the construction of any provision of the
Convention in such a way as to permit a state party, group or individ-
ual to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of rights recognized by the
Convention, or to restrict the freedoms guaranteed by the American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man or by other treaties to
which the state may be a party.39 Similarly, one may not read the Con-
pension of Guarantees: A Comparative Analysis of the American Convention on
Human Rights and the Constitutions of the States Parties. 30 AM. U.L. REV. 189,
191-98 (1980) (discussing circumstances under which individual guarantees may be
suspended).
35. 1978 Report on Nicaragua, supra note 7, at 78. The Somoza Government had
done this in so egregious a manner, the Commission determined, as to have "awakened
in a very forceful way, an intense and general feeling among the Nicaraguan people for
the establishment of a system which will guarantee the observance of human rights."
Id.
36. Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1, para. 1.
37. Id. at art. 2.
38. Id. at arts. 3-6, 9, 12, 17-20, 23.
39. Id. at art. 29(a), (b), and (d).
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vention as precluding any rights and guarantees that are "inherent in
the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a
form of government. 40
Accordingly, a national legal order which contravenes these funda-
mental principles is incompatible with the requirements of the Ameri-
can Convention. The case of Nicaragua under Somoza is again instruc-
tive. Referring to the legal order and the norms then in force in that
country with respect to states of siege, the Commission pointed out that
they:
create in the socio-political reality of the country, a legal structure from the for-
mal point of view, but from the material point of view, this turns into a legal
abnormality, since it lends itself to a systematic and generalized violation of
human rights ... 41
Furthermore, as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
stressed in the Resolution on the Protection of Human Rights in Con-
nection with the Suspension of Constitutional Guarantees or the State
of Siege, the norms of the Convention bearing on emergency situations
only permit the defense of democratic regimes respectful of human
rights.'2
D. PROPER NOTiCE
The declaration of emergency provisions derogating certain obliga-
tions imposed by the Convention must satisfy certain requirements of
proper notice.43 In the first place, in order to be valid the emergency
provisions must provide the country's inhabitants a reasonable guide for
conduct. To accomplish this, it is necessary that the emergency provi-
sions be published in sufficient detail. Consequently, secret norms or
illegal actions by the authorities will not satisfy those standards which
permit the suspension of guarantees. 4
A second requirement of proper notice is the immediate notification
of all other state parties to the Convention by means of a communica-
40. Id. at art. 29(c).
41. 1978 Report on Nicaragua, supra note 7, at 30; see also 1979 Report on Haiti,
supra note 7, at 87 (the Government of Haiti's suspension of individual guarantees
leaves insufficient protection for the rights outlined in the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man); Report on Bolivia, supra note 7, at 113 (the Government
of Bolivia's suspension of political rights violates the American Convention on Human
Rights).
42. Annual Report of the Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights 1980-81,
supra note 17, at 2-3.
43. 1983 Report on Nicaragua, supra note 7, at 113-22; Report on Bolivia, supra
note 7, at 22-23.
44. Report on Bolivia, supra note 7, at 22, 63-64.
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tion to the Secretary General of the Organization of American
States.45 The communication must meet certain conditions established
in article 27 of the American Convention in order to be valid: (1) it
must explicitly designate those rights guaranteed by the Convention
which the state is suspending; (2) it must state the circumstances that
require the suspension; and (3) it must set an exact date for the termi-
nation of such suspension.4 The purpose of these conditions is to per-
mit the relevant OAS organs and the other state parties to execute
their supervisory responsibilities in monitoring compliance with the
Convention. This is especially important in emergency situations, when
respect for human rights is most often in danger. To achieve this pur-
pose, it is necessary that the derogating party provide detailed informa-
tion concerning the suspension of rights, in order that the OAS and
these other states may form a complete opinion regarding the derogat-
ing party's degree of conformance with its international obligations. 47
E. CONDUCT
The requirement of "conduct" suggests that the state party declaring
the emergency situation must behave in accordance with the Conven-
tion. While this may seem obvious, it is critical to identify conduct as a
distinct element because it is the concrete behavior of government au-
thorities that ultimately determines the lawfulness of a state of
emergency.
The conduct that is required of the authorities during states of emer-
gency is that enunciated in the first paragraph of article 1 of the Con-
vention, i.e., to respect the recognized rights and freedoms and to en-
sure their exercise without any discrimination.48 Even in an emergency
situation, according to the Convention, a state party may not interpret
any of its emergency provisions as permitting it to suppress or limit the
enjoyment of rights beyond certain prescribed limits. 49 At a minimum,
45. Convention, supra note 3, at art. 27, para. 3.
46. Id.
47. 1983 Report on Nicaragua, supra note 7, at 121. The Inter-American Commis-
sion recently has shown interest in analyzing whether the conditions necessary to de-
clare a state of siege are present or not, even when the respective state party has not
observed the formal requisites that Article 27(3) establishes. Id. A variety of factors
may have influenced the Commission. First, in the case of Nicaragua, the Commission
felt that clearly a state of emergency had been communicated. Further, in the opinion
of the Commission, the declaration of a state of exception in this particular case could
have prevented the creation of a climate of unfounded terror which was provoked by a
lack of knowledge of the goals that the government wanted to achieve. Id.
48. Convention, supra note 3, at art. I.
49. Id. art. 29.
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then, disrespect and disregard for human rights, or discrimination in
their protection, cannot accompany the invocation of emergency pow-
ers. Moreover, the requirement of conduct extends to both actions and
failure to act. The Convention imposes an affirmative responsibility on
states to prevent or quell violations of the Convention. Because states of
siege create the danger that certain rights might be violated, the duty
in article 1 to respect and ensure rights gives rise to the correlative
duty to do all that is necessary to prevent abuses. State parties can
fulfill this obligation by ensuring that each emergency measure which
suspends or limits some provision of the Convention is accompanied by
a second measure that: (1) inhibits possible abuses which may be more
likely to occur as a consequence of the suspension" and (2) guarantees
the investigation and punishment of those responsible for the violation
of human rights."'
III. CRITERIA FOR THE SUSPENSION OF RIGHTS
DURING A STATE OF EMERGENCY
When all of the aforementioned criteria for the valid declaration of a
state of emergency have been satisfied, the actual suspension of certain
human rights guarantees may become lawful under the American Con-
vention. The state party, however, does not receive carte blanche to
suspend human rights protections; the Convention carefully restricts
the nature and extent of permissible derogations.
A. ABSOLUTE RIGHTS
Even during a proclaimed emergency, the state may restrict only cer-
tain specified individual freedoms. The American Convention estab-
lishes a system comprising two distinct categories of human rights:
nonderogable rights which a state party may never suspend regardless
of the gravity of the circumstances, and those rights which it may re-
strict to a limited degree. Article 27 of the Convention enumerates the
following rights as absolute and nonderogable: rights to life, to a name
and nationality, to legal personality, to humane treatment while in cus-
tody, to freedom from slavery and from ex post facto laws, rights of
the child and of the family, freedom of conscience and religion, and the
50. See Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
1980-81, supra note 17 at 119, 121-23 (referring to the need to adopt measures in
order to avoid abuses with respect to detentions without due process, expulsion of na-
tionals, freedom of expression and information and political rights).
51. Convention, supra note 3, at art. 41(d); see also infra note 72 (discussing art.
41(d) in detail).
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right to participate in government.82 It also prohibits suspension of the
judicial guarantees that are essential for the protection of these
rights."3 In addition, article 27, as well as articles 1 and 24 of the Con-
vention establish the absolute right to freedom from any form of dis-
crimination.54 In all, approximately one half of the civil and political
rights established by the American Convention on Human Rights are
not subject to suspension, even during an officially declared state of
siege. 55
The list of absolute rights in the American Convention has two char-
acteristics that distinguish it from analogous provisions in other human
rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. While the
three treaties seek to provide many of the same protections, and while
each of the treaties prohibits the suspension of certain freedoms even
during a national emergency, the array of rights in the nonderogable
category is much more comprehensive in the American Convention
than in either of the other two instruments. 6 In addition, only the
American Convention explicitly notes that judicial guarantees indispen-
sible for the protection of these absolute rights are not derogable. 17
B. DEROGABLE RIGHTS
The second category of rights that exist under the Convention are
those which a contracting party may legitimately suspend during a
state of emergency if it meets the strict requirements of the Conven-
tion. Because a national emergency during which recognized rights are
actually suspended is the most precarious time for the viability of a
democratic system, the Convention establishes a detailed series of re-
52. Convention, supra note 3, at art. 27, para. 2.
53. Id.
54. Id. at art. I, para. 1.
55. Substantive rights are established by twenty-four different articles of the Amer-
ican Convention. Id. arts. 1, and 3-25. The Convention prohibits a state party from
derogating from its obligations under twelve of these provisions. Id. at arts. 1, 3-6, 9,
12, 17-20, 23.
56. Compare Convention, supra note 3, at art. 27, para. 2 (prohibiting suspension
of arts. 3-6, 9, 12, 17-20, and 23 during a state emergency) with International Cove-
nant, supra note 2, at art. 4, para. 2 (prohibiting derogation from arts. 6-8 (paras. 1-2),
11, 15-16, and 18 during a public emergency) and European Convention, supra note 2,
at art. 15, para. 2 (prohibiting derogation from arts. 2-4 (para. 1), and 7 during a
public emergency).
57. Convention, supra note 3, at art. 27, para. 2. See INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, TEN YEARS OF ACTIVITIES 1971-1981 327-29 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as TEN YEARS OF AcTIVrnaES (discussing judicial guarantees). In addition, the
reports on Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti (1981), and Nicaragua, supra note 7,
contain noteworthy chapters on judicial guarantees.
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quirements governing the suspension of derogable rights. These require-
ments are: (1) necessity; (2) temporality; (3) proportionality; (4) non-
discrimination; (5) compatibility with other international obligations;
and (6) adherence to domestic law.
1. Necessity
The valid proclamation of a state of emergency does not automati-
cally justify a state's derogation from particular human rights obliga-
tions. No particular derogation of a given right can be deemed neces-
sary if a less drastic option for state action is available.0 8 The Inter-
American Commission has clearly indicated that suspension of a dero-
gable right is "only justifiable in the absence of another alternative for
resolving a serious emergency." 59 Accordingly, a finding of necessity
requires an analysis of the general situation of a country-including
consideration of possible substitute measures that would not involve
suspension of rights-and an assessment of the actual need for each
individual derogation.
2. Temporality
Temporality refers to the duration of emergency measures. As article
27 points out in its first paragraph, a suspension of rights is valid only
"for the time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation."60 The
requirement of temporality strictly excludes an expansive assessment of
the necessary duration of any suspension of rights. Derogation from
human rights obligations for an unlimited period of time constitutes a
violation of the Convention, as does maintenance of such measures once
the circumstances motivating them have ended." The Inter-American
Commission has indicated that in order to avoid a violation of the re-
quirement of temporality, it is not sufficient to terminate a derogation;
rather, the government must take positive action to restore the enjoy-
ment of rights to persons affected through appropriate actions including
provision of adequate compensation where appropriate. 2
58. Norris & Reiton, supra note 34, at 201.
59. 1983 Report on Nicaragua, supra note 7, at 125-26.
60. Convention, supra note 3, at art. 27, para. 1.
61. TEN YEARS OF AcTIvITIEs, supra note 57, at 336-39; 1983 Report on Nicara-
gua, supra note 7, at 124.
62. TEN YEARS OF AcTivITIaS, supra note 57, at 323-25; 1983 Report on Nicara-
gua, supra note 7, at 126-27, 140-41.
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3. Proportionality
The Convention limits any suspension of the state's obligations con-
tracted under the Convention to the "extent .. .strictly required."' 3
The requirement of proportionality prohibits unnecessary suspension of
specific rights, greater restrictions on those rights than necessary, or the
unnecessary extension of the geographical area to which the state of
emergency applies. Like the requirements of necessity and temporality,
the proportionality standard is a strict one. It does not allow a state
party to justify unwarranted abuses of human rights with vague argu-
ments about national security; a derogation which is disproportionate to
the situation is one which is illegal.
4. Nondiscrimination
The prohibition against discrimination is of such importance that it
is stipulated in article 27 as well as in articles 1 and article 24.4 The
multiple reference to this prohibition, not unusual in international in-
struments related to the protection of human rights, serves to codify
what is already a fundamental principle of jus cogens: the total pro-
scription of any form of discriminatory treatment based on race, reli-
gion, sex, ethnic group, political belief or other such quality. 5 In accor-
dance with this principle, otherwise legitimate suspensions of derogable
rights can become invalid if they violate the prohibition against dis-
crimination. The principle of nondiscrimination attaches to each one of
the rights enumerated in the American Convention, and also to any
restriction which a state party may place on these rights.
5. Compatibility with other International Obligations
The restrictions on permissible state action in a time of emergency
may extend beyond those explicitly delineated in the American Con-
vention. According to article 27, state action must also be compatible
with all other international legal obligations which are binding on the
derogating party. 6 Therefore, this may expand the list of nonderogable
rights enumerated earlier.67 For example, although a state party to the
63. Convention, supra note 3, at art. 27, para. 1.
64. Id. arts. 1, 24, and 27. See generally Norris & Reiton, supra note 34, at 203
(discussing the control of the prohibition against discrimination in the Convention).
65. See, e.g., A.G. ROBLEDO, EL Jus COGENS INTERNACIONAL: ESTUDIO HISTOR-
ICO CRITICO, 198-204 (1982) (describing various principles of jus cogens, including the
right to freedom from discrimination).
66. Convention, supra note 3, at art. 27, para. 1.
67. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (while other international legal
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American Convention may legally suspend the right to not be impris-
oned for debt if this suspension proves necessary during a state of siege,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights characterizes
its version of the same freedom as nonderogable. This right therefore
acquires nonderogable status under the American Convention for those
states which are parties to both treaties.8 This requirement of compati-
bility makes it necessary to conduct an exhaustive review of all obliga-
tions that are in force vis-a-vis the respective American state. If these
obligations preclude any measure which the American Convention on
Human Rights otherwise permits, implementation of that measure will
place the state party in violation of article 27 of the American
Convention. 9
6. Adherence to Domestic Law
The American Convention does not authorize the disregard of the
internal law of the derogating state party during a state of emergency.
The Convention specifically precludes any restriction on rights or free-
doms-even if the restriction satisfies all other conditions established in
the Convention-unless it is applied "in accordance with [the respec-
tive state party's own domestic] laws enacted for reasons of general
interest . ,,*"70 The Inter-American Commission has consistently
viewed restrictive action by state authorities, at or outside the margin
of their own laws, as a violation of the Convention as well.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED SUPERVISORY
ACTIVITIES
As discussed above, precise standards exist for the evaluation of dec-
larations of states of exception and consequent restrictions of human
rights by state parties to the American Convention. Application of
these standards by the Inter-American Commission have, in some
cases, curtailed gross and systematic violations of essential human
rights. If properly observed and enforced, the standards governing
states of siege will bring greater stability to the countries of this hemi-
sphere and more secure freedoms for their peoples. There is, of course,
obligations may expand the list of nonderogable rights, such obligations may definitely
not contract the list.).
68. Of the 21 states party to the American Convention, 16 are also party to the
International Covenant: Barbados, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, United
States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
69. 1983 Report on Nicaragua, supra note 7, at 125.
70. Convention, supra note 3, at art. 30.
19861
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
room for improvement.
There is a need for standards to increase compatibility between in-
ternal law and the norms of the American Convention concerning
states of exception. Article 41 empowers the Commission to conduct
such studies as it considers advisable and to solicit all pertinent infor-
mation from national governments. Pursuant to this mandate and with
the goal of achieving a greater level of coordination within the Inter-
American system, the Commission could prepare, for example, a ques-
tionnaire to obtain from all state parties to the American Convention
detailed information regarding the internal norms that define the neces-
sary conditions for declaring states of emergency and for restricting the
rights of the population. Such studies, as a source of reference and
comparison, could provide model guidelines to the states. Together with
the final publication of these studies, including the responses of govern-
ments, the Commission might seriously consider formulating recom-
mendations and model legislation in order to make national norms
compatible with international norms. This model legislation would
specify all the valid conditions for states of emergency and the legiti-
mate rights consequences that may stem from them.
There is a need for further systematization of the jurisprudence of
the American Convention with respect to states of exception. Addi-
tional studies could address, for example, the enumeration of nondero-
gable judicial guarantees; the list of absolute rights which are derived
from sources other than the American Convention; and the applicable
norms for collective economic, social and cultural rights.
Because massive and gross violations of human rights are often the
immediate product of a declaration of an emergency situation, the In-
ter-American Commission should take an active supervisory role and
communicate with local authorities immediately following such decla-
ration. The Commission should provide a model questionnaire in order
to assist the state in the preparation of the specific information required
by article 27 of the Convention.7 1 To ensure complete information, the
Commission should direct a similar questionnaire to non-governmental
organizations. This information might then be sent to the government
involved, with the request for an appropriate response in accordance
with article 41 of the Convention. 2
In addition to sending to the state party a model questionnaire, the
Commission should strictly monitor countries under states of emer-
gency. On-site visits have been one of the most effective instruments
71. Id. at art. 27, para. 3.
72. Id. at art. 41(d).
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utilized by the Commission; 3 negotiations to arrange on-site visits
should begin as soon as there are indications that a state of siege is
occurring. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights could
also undertake a variety of promotional activities necessary to augment
the efficacy of international action.74 For example, the Annual Report
of the Commission to the General Assembly of the OAS should contain
a permanent chapter on states of emergency, providing, at a minimum,
data regarding the countries that have declared a state of emergency,
the duration of the emergency, the rights affected, and the information
required and received. The General Assembly should explicitly discuss
each country suspending human rights under a state of siege rather
than simply addressing issues in a general fashion, as is currently the
case.The rich experience of the Commission and the Secretariat pro-
vides a firm basis for optimism regarding the advancement of human
rights within the Inter-American system. As noted, international law
cannot guarantee its own efficacy. Nevertheless, within the American
hemisphere it both reflects and mobilizes the population's abhorrence of
the violation of essential rights. Therein lies its strength and its
promise.
73. See Norris, Observations In Loco: Practice and Procedure of the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Human Rights, 15 TEx. INT'L L.J. 46-95 (1980) (providing an in-
depth discussion of the Inter-American Commission's on-site visits).
74. J. Hartman, Working Paper Delivered at the Meeting of Experts on Derogation
and Limitation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
in Siricusa, Sicily (April 30-May 4, 1984) (organized by the International Commis-
sion of Jurists, the International Association of Penal Law, the American Association
for the International Commission of Jurists, the Urban Morgan Institute of Human
Rights, and the Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences) (copy on file at the
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y editorial offices); INT'L CONIM'N OF JURSTS, supra note 5,
at 463-64.
1986]
